matrix-org/matrix-ios-sdk

matrix-org/matrix-ios-sdk

The Matrix SDK for iOS

CVE History

CVEPublishedCVSS v2CVSS v3
CVE-2022-392557.5 HIGHN/A
Matrix iOS SDK allows developers to build iOS apps compatible with Matrix. Prior to version 0.23.19, an attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages that legitimately appear to have come from another person, without any indication such as a grey shield. Additionally, a sophisticated attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver could employ this vulnerability to perform a targeted attack in order to send fake to-device messages appearing to originate from another user. This can allow, for example, to inject the key backup secret during a self-verification, to make a targeted device start using a malicious key backup spoofed by the homeserver. These attacks are possible due to a protocol confusion vulnerability that accepts to-device messages encrypted with Megolm instead of Olm. matrix-ios-sdk version 0.23.19 has been modified to only accept Olm-encrypted to-device messages. Out of caution, several other checks have been audited or added. This attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, so those who trust their home servers do not need a workaround. To avoid malicious backup attacks, one should not verify one's new logins using emoji/QR verifications methods until patched.
CVE-2022-392577.5 HIGHN/A
Matrix iOS SDK allows developers to build iOS apps compatible with Matrix. Prior to version 0.23.19, an attacker cooperating with a malicious homeserver can construct messages appearing to have come from another person. Such messages will be marked with a grey shield on some platforms, but this may be missing in others. This attack is possible due to the matrix-ios-sdk implementing a too permissive key forwarding strategy. The default policy for accepting key forwards has been made more strict in the matrix-ios-sdk version 0.23.19. matrix-ios-sdk will now only accept forwarded keys in response to previously issued requests and only from own, verified devices. The SDK now sets a `trusted` flag on the decrypted message upon decryption, based on whether the key used to decrypt the message was received from a trusted source. Clients need to ensure that messages decrypted with a key with `trusted = false` are decorated appropriately (for example, by showing a warning for such messages). This attack requires coordination between a malicious home server and an attacker, so those who trust their home servers do not need a workaround.