Secsys-FDU/LLM-Tool-Calling-CVEs

Ridvay Code's command auto-approval module contains a critical OS command injection vulnerability that renders its whitelist security mechanism completely ineffective. The system relies on fragile regular expressions to parse command structures; while it attempts to intercept dangerous operations, it fails to account for standard Shell command substitution Ridvay Code (specifically$(...)and backticks ...). An attacker can construct a command such as git log --grep="$(malicious_command)", forcing Syntx to misidentify it as a safe git operation and automatically approve it. The underlying Shell prioritizes the execution of the malicious code injected within the arguments, resulting in Remote Code Execution without any user interaction.

DSAI-Cline's command auto-approval module contains a critical OS command injection vulnerability that renders its whitelist security mechanism completely ineffective. The system relies on string-based parsing to validate commands; while it intercepts dangerous operators such as ;, &&, ||, |, and command substitution patterns, it fails to account for raw newline characters embedded within the input. An attacker can construct a payload by embedding a literal newline between a whitelisted command and malicious code (e.g., git log malicious_command), forcing DSAI-Cline to misidentify it as a safe operation and automatically approve it. The underlying PowerShell interpreter treats the newline as a command separator, executing both commands sequentially, resulting in Remote Code Execution without any user interaction.

InfCode's terminal auto-execution module contains a critical command filtering vulnerability that renders its blacklist security mechanism completely ineffective. The predefined blocklist fails to cover native high-risk commands in Windows PowerShell (such as powershell), and the matching algorithm lacks dynamic semantic parsing unable to recognize string concatenation, variable assignment, or double-quote interpolation in Shell syntax. Malicious commands can bypass interception through simple syntax obfuscation. An attacker can construct a file containing malicious instructions for remote code injection. When a user imports and views such a file in the IDE, the Agent executes dangerous PowerShell commands outside the blacklist without user confirmation, resulting in arbitrary command execution or sensitive data leakage.

Ridvay Code's command auto-approval module contains a critical OS command injection vulnerability that renders its whitelist security mechanism completely ineffective. The system relies on fragile regular expressions to parse command structures; while it attempts to intercept dangerous operations, it fails to account for standard Shell command substitution Ridvay Code (specifically$(...)and backticks ...). An attacker can construct a command such as git log --grep="$(malicious_command)", forcing Syntx to misidentify it as a safe git operation and automatically approve it. The underlying Shell prioritizes the execution of the malicious code injected within the arguments, resulting in Remote Code Execution without any user interaction.

In its design for automatic terminal command execution, Sixth offers two options: Execute safe commands and Execute all commands. The description for the former states that commands determined by the model to be safe will be automatically executed, whereas if the model judges a command to be potentially destructive, it still requires user approval. However, this design is highly susceptible to prompt injection attacks. An attacker can employ a generic template to wrap any malicious command and mislead the model into misclassifying it as a 'safe' command, thereby bypassing the user approval requirement and resulting in arbitrary command execution.

In its design for automatic terminal command execution, HAI Build Code Generator offers two options: Execute safe commands and Execute all commands. The description for the former states that commands determined by the model to be safe will be automatically executed, whereas if the model judges a command to be potentially destructive, it still requires user approval. However, this design is highly susceptible to prompt injection attacks. An attacker can employ a generic template to wrap any malicious command and mislead the model into misclassifying it as a 'safe' command, thereby bypassing the user approval requirement and resulting in arbitrary command execution.

DSAI-Cline's command auto-approval module contains a critical OS command injection vulnerability that renders its whitelist security mechanism completely ineffective. The system relies on string-based parsing to validate commands; while it intercepts dangerous operators such as ;, &&, ||, |, and command substitution patterns, it fails to account for raw newline characters embedded within the input. An attacker can construct a payload by embedding a literal newline between a whitelisted command and malicious code (e.g., git log malicious_command), forcing DSAI-Cline to misidentify it as a safe operation and automatically approve it. The underlying PowerShell interpreter treats the newline as a command separator, executing both commands sequentially, resulting in Remote Code Execution without any user interaction.

In its design for automatic terminal command execution, SakaDev offers two options: Execute safe commands and execute all commands. The description for the former states that commands determined by the model to be safe will be automatically executed, whereas if the model judges a command to be potentially destructive, it still requires user approval. However, this design is highly susceptible to prompt injection attacks. An attacker can employ a generic template to wrap any malicious command and mislead the model into misclassifying it as a 'safe' command, thereby bypassing the user approval requirement and resulting in arbitrary command execution.

Roo Code's command auto-approval module contains a critical OS command injection vulnerability that renders its whitelist security mechanism completely ineffective. The system relies on fragile regular expressions to parse command structures; while it attempts to intercept dangerous operations, it fails to account for standard Shell command substitution Roo Code (specifically$(...)and backticks ...). An attacker can construct a command such as git log --grep="$(malicious_command)", forcing Syntx to misidentify it as a safe git operation and automatically approve it. The underlying Shell prioritizes the execution of the malicious code injected within the arguments, resulting in Remote Code Execution without any user interaction.

Syntx's command auto-approval module contains a critical OS command injection vulnerability that renders its whitelist security mechanism completely ineffective. The system relies on fragile regular expressions to parse command structures; while it attempts to intercept dangerous operations, it fails to account for standard Shell command substitution syntax (specifically $(...)and backticks ...). An attacker can construct a command such as git log --grep="$(malicious_command)", forcing Syntx to misidentify it as a safe git operation and automatically approve it. The underlying Shell prioritizes the execution of the malicious code injected within the arguments, resulting in Remote Code Execution without any user interaction.

The command auto-approval module in CodeRider-Kilo contains an OS Command Injection vulnerability, rendering its whitelist security mechanism ineffective. The vulnerability stems from the incorrect use of an incompatible command parser (the Unix-based shell-quote library) to analyze commands on the Windows platform, coupled with a failure to correctly handle Windows CMD-specific escape sequences (^). Attackers can exploit this discrepancy between the parsing logic and the execution environment by constructing payloads such as git log ^" & malicious_command ^". The CodeRider-Kilo parser is deceived by the escape characters, misinterpreting the malicious command connector (&) as being within a protected string argument and thus auto-approving the command. However, the underlying Windows CMD interpreter ignores the escaped quotes, parsing and executing the subsequent malicious command directly. This allows attackers to achieve arbitrary Remote Code Execution (RCE) after bypassing what appears to be a legitimate Git whitelist check.

In its design for automatic terminal command execution, AI Code offers two options: Execute safe commands and execute all commands. The description for the former states that commands determined by the model to be safe will be automatically executed, whereas if the model judges a command to be potentially destructive, it still requires user approval. However, this design is highly susceptible to prompt injection attacks. An attacker can employ a generic template to wrap any malicious command and mislead the model into misclassifying it as a 'safe' command, thereby bypassing the user approval requirement and resulting in arbitrary command execution.

The command auto-approval module in Axon Code contains an OS Command Injection vulnerability, rendering its whitelist security mechanism ineffective. The vulnerability stems from the incorrect use of an incompatible command parser (the Unix-based shell-quote library) to analyze commands on the Windows platform, coupled with a failure to correctly handle Windows CMD-specific escape sequences (^). Attackers can exploit this discrepancy between the parsing logic and the execution environment by constructing payloads such as git log ^" & malicious_command ^". The Axon Code parser is deceived by the escape characters, misinterpreting the malicious command connector (&) as being within a protected string argument and thus auto-approving the command. However, the underlying Windows CMD interpreter ignores the escaped quotes, parsing and executing the subsequent malicious command directly. This allows attackers to achieve arbitrary Remote Code Execution (RCE) after bypassing what appears to be a legitimate Git whitelist check.