Crates.io
CVE History
| CVE | Affected | Published | CVSS v3 | CVSS v2 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| >= 0.11.0, < 0.11.4 | 7.5 HIGH | — | ||
Quinn is a pure-Rust, async-compatible implementation of the IETF QUIC transport protocol. As of quinn-proto 0.11, it is possible for a server to `accept()`, `retry()`, `refuse()`, or `ignore()` an `Incoming` connection. However, calling `retry()` on an unvalidated connection exposes the server to a likely panic in the following situations: 1. Calling `refuse` or `ignore` on the resulting validated connection, if a duplicate initial packet is received. This issue can go undetected until a server's `refuse()`/`ignore()` code path is exercised, such as to stop a denial of service attack. 2. Accepting when the initial packet for the resulting validated connection fails to decrypt or exhausts connection IDs, if a similar initial packet that successfully decrypts and doesn't exhaust connection IDs is received. This issue can go undetected if clients are well-behaved. The former situation was observed in a real application, while the latter is only theoretical. | ||||
| >= 0.10.0, < 0.10.5, < 0.9.5 | 7.5 HIGH | — | ||
quinn-proto is a state machine for the QUIC transport protocol. Prior to versions 0.9.5 and 0.10.5, receiving unknown QUIC frames in a QUIC packet could result in a panic. The problem has been fixed in 0.9.5 and 0.10.5 maintenance releases. | ||||
| >= 0.6.0, < 0.6.2, < 0.5.4, >= 0.0.0-0, < 0.5.4, >= 0.6.0-0, < 0.6.2, >= 0.7.0-0, < 0.7.0 | 7.5 HIGH | 5 MEDIUM | ||
An issue was discovered in the quinn crate before 0.7.0 for Rust. It may have invalid memory access for certain versions of the standard library because it relies on a direct cast of std::net::SocketAddrV4 and std::net::SocketAddrV6 data structures. | ||||